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Management's Response to the
Takeover Attempt
William H. Steinbrink*
Current corporateand securities law theory characterizesattempted acquisitions by means of the tender offer device as an investment decision most appropriately considered by shareholders acting individually, rather than a corporate
decision to which management's expertise is best suited The authorchallengesthe
current scope of subject company management's permissible responses to tender
offers, rejectingthe argumentthat such a restrictive approachis the inevitable extension of traditionalnotions of management'sfiduciary obligations.Heproposes
alternativemanagement responses which morefully utilize the unique appreciation
of managementfor thepotentialimpact ofa change in corporatecontrolnot only
on the internalaffairs of the corporation,but also on the long range economic
interests of subject company's shareholdersand on the external community. Mr.
Steinbrink then suggestspossible meansfor implementation of such policies both
governmentally and through individual corporateaction.

MANAGEMENT'S RESPONSE to the typical hostile tender
offer often has been characterized as a self-interested effort by
the officers and the individual directors of the target company to
maintain their entrenched positions, employment, perquisites,
and, most importantly, control.' Corporate executives have been
counseled, without necessarily being dubbed protectors of the corporate weal, to implement various changes in corporate structure,
to develop black books, and generally to fight like hell when a
takeover attempt looms. 2 The context, thus, is one of a battle between white hats and black hats placed on the different sets of
heads in accordance with one's predilection or, more commonly,
self-interest as a lawyer, investment banker, labor leader, or state
politician.
Although management is a very significant participant in this
struggle for hegemony over corporate assets, the legal foundation
*

A.B. (1964), Wittenberg University; LL.B. (1967), Duke University. The author is

a partner with the law firm of Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue in Cleveland. He is admitted to
the Ohio Bar.
1. FullDisclosure of CorporateEquity Ownership in CorporateTakeover Bids: Hearings on S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency,90th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1967) (statement of Manuel F. Cohen).
2.
See generally P. DAVEY, DEFENSES AGAINST UNNEGOTIATED CASH TENDER
OFFERS, RESEARCH REPORT, THE CONFERENCE BOARD (1977).
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for management's defensive activities has not been thoughtfully
modeled. The premise of the following discussion is that management indeed does have, both in fact and in law, a legitimate, central position in the corporate takeover accomplished through a
tender offer. To articulate management's role, the current tender
offer context must be explored, and alternative responses of management have to be reviewed. Because management's role is not
well understood, it is also important to explore what actions can
be taken by the shareholders or perhaps state legislatures to articulate further the proper basis for management's response to the
takeover attempt.
I. A

CHANGED ENVIRONMENT FOR TAKEOVERS

As the waging of this corporate warfare has evolved into a less
impulsive and more sophisticated process, tolerance for management's interference with a hostile tender offer has waned. Injunctions against offers cannot be obtained easily.3 Lawyers have
recognized a duty in corporate fiduciaries to evaluate responsibly
offers that are made, whether or not management is in favor of the
combination.4 Moreover, state takeover statutes have become an
obstacle to be cleared instead of a moat protecting corporate
fiefdoms.5
The focus for this movement has been on the shareholder. As
long as the thrust of management's effort is the prevention or destruction of a tender offer, the necessary consequence is that
shareholders are denied an opportunity to dispose of their invest3. See, e.g., Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 919 (1974) (preliminary injunction to enjoin tender offer on basis of
antitrust allegations denied); Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp., 528 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1975) (injunction to prevent the voting of shares acquired in tender offer process denied); Scott v. MultiAmp. Corp., 386 F. Supp. 44 (D.N.J. 1974) (injunction to prevent shares acquired in tender
offer from being voted denied). Cf. Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975)
(corporation denied permanent injunctive relief against shareholder who failed to comply
with § 13(d) filing requirement, since no irreparable harm shown). For a suggestion that,
absent willful noncompliance, offerors will be able to amend defective disclosure statements to correct misstatements or omissions without meaningful penalty under the implications of Rondeau and that both preliminary and permanent injunctive relief will be
increasingly difficult to obtain, see E. ARANow, H. EINHORN, & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 128-29, 132 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as DEVELOPMENTS]. See generally Connelly, The Boom in Unfriendly Takeovers, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS (June, 1975).
4. See Flom, Forcinga Friendly Offer, 32 Bus. LAW. 1319 (1976); Small, Defending
Target Companies-GeneralPerspectives,32 Bus. LAW. 1349 (1976).
5. Compare Flom, The Role of the Takeover in the American Economy, 32 Bus.
LAW. 1299 (1976) with Vorys, Ohio Tender Offers Bihll 43 OHIO B. 65, 73 (1970).
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ment on terms that often are superior to what they could obtain in

ordinary market transactions. The emphatic underpinning of the
securities acts on investor protection, the pervasive notion of
shareholder democracy, and common greed are pitted against
management's objective of keeping the offer from being made or,

at least, completed. It is not surprising, therefore, that management has not fared well on the battlefield or found much assistance or tolerance from regulators and commentators.
A.

The Needfor Recognition of A New CorporateModel

The function and posture of equity investors in professionally
managed businesses as they exist in America in the last quarter of
the twentieth century need to be reexamined on theoretical and
practical planes. A redefinition seems especially pertinent as soci-

etal concerns are increasingly given prominence over private economic interests. Management's disassociation from ownership of
the corporation must be acknowledged in law and theory as it has
been in fact, and equity investors should be recognized as simply
an alternative source of capital for the maintenance and operation

of the corporation's business.6 Equity investors may be entitled to

rights different from those of other types of capital providers, but
their ability to affect and direct the corporation's affairs should be

subordinated to the professional management of the corporation.
Management should be recognized as possessing the responsibility
and power to shape the corporation's business, its development, its
return to investors, and its satisfaction of social requirements. It
should simultaneously be accountable to a broad spectrum of interests.
Bringing the philosophical and legal analysis of management
into conformity with the needs of the twenty-first century should
yield a changed perception of management's role in the hostile
6. Seegenerall, Address by John R. Evans, Comm'r, SEC, to Soe'y of Corp. Secretaries, Middle At. Regional Group, Wash., D.C. (Jan. 11, 1978):
It is apparent, at least to me, that despite various statutes and SEC regulations,
shareholder democracy today is much more an appealing concept than an operating reality. Although it is possible to document the current lack of shareholder
involvement in corporate affairs, it is a far more difficult task to gauge precisely
the degree to which this lack of participation is reflective of general apathy or of
frustration with an inadequate corporate governance system. Even though many
will disagree, it is my opinion that most shareholders are primarily, if not almost
exclusively, interested in a return on their investment through dividends and capital appreciation, and that they do not or cannot devote the time, energy, or resources necessary to become involved in the governance of corporations which
they in part own.
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tender offer as well. Inflexible legal principles and regulatory requirements now place equity investors at the center of tender offer
activities. Conforming these restraints to present-day needs would
justify management behaving as it has in the recent past and as it
would very much like to today.
Without this necessary evolution in the understanding of business corporations and management's central position therein, an
examination must be made of the present legal rules to discern
how management is expected to react when an uninvited acquisition attempt is launched and what limitations keep that reaction
within the range of public expectations. The process and results of
this examination will be significantly affected by the tender offer
environment at the time such an examination is made. Thinking
about these questions in 1978 should produce a more balanced
appraisal of management's role than would have emerged even
three years ago, due to the changed applications of the tender offer device and an evolving comprehension of the tender offer
process by both investors and the public.
B.

The Role of Tender Offers in 1978

There is little comprehensive analytical data about the impact
of tender offers; it is, therefore, difficult to make simple assertions
with respect to target companies and takeovers generally.7 However, it cannot be gainsaid that there has been a significant change
in the types of companies involved in takeover contests. The
tender offer has become an acceptable acquisition device. It is no
7. Examining the methods by which various managements have responded to takeover attempts and assessing the results of those diverse responses is far more difficult given
the marked insufficiency of data than speculating about the breadth of management's ability to respond. Although there is a high likelihood that information gathered through
personal observation may be incomplete, a limited set of conclusions can be set forth on the
basis of practical experience. The first operating assumption is that once a takeover bid is
proposed openly, the fate of the company is almost irreversibly set. It is unlikely to continue as an independent company. Either it will change hands as the result of a contested
takeover attempt, or it will engage in a negotiated transaction with another party. It also
appears that some companies, when faced with an unsolicited takeover offer, strive diligently to improve that offer but nonetheless yield to the acquisition demand of the offeror.
A much more meaningful analysis of management's response to takeover attempts
would be possible if a greater amount of empirical data were at hand in easily usable form.
To reach a conclusion on the ultimate question of whether takeover bids are economically
and socially desirable, such information must be collected about the aims and consequences flowing from a takeover. A probe into management's motivation in opposing
takeover attempts would also be instructive as to how much latitude management should
be given to carry out that opposition. Studies of this type should necessarily go beyond the
consequences to investors and try to reach the various noninvestment considerations.
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longer the tool solely of raiders and plunderers or of less objectionable acquisition-oriented empire-builders.8 While more companies are thus using and are interested in using the tender offer,9
the types of companies whose shares are the subject of offers have
also changed. Tender offers have been used in acquisitions of very
large companies; it is no longer, if it ever was, a technique useful
only for corporations having a modest aggregate stock market
value.
There also has been an evolution in the way that takeovers are
accomplished. The totally unforeseen blitzkrieg, "Saturday night
special" offer seems to have disappeared. The "bear-hug"'" and
its numerous variants have become the common tack of the lawyers and investment bankers advising offerors. This change in tactics has been in part an adjustment to the prenotification and
extended minimum duration periods for takeover offers required
under the state takeover statutes."l It also reflects an attempt to
deal with the more troublesome defensive techniques employed
2
by management.'
A much more competitive situation has emerged to alter further the tender offer gambit. A publicly announced intention to
make an offer and even an actual announced offer are often met
promptly with a higher offer by another suitor, either acting at the
instigation of the target company's management or on its own assessment of the acquisition opportunity. Multiple offers, both
solicited and unsolicited, are thus becoming the normal situation.
In addition to these developments in the takeover process, the
nature of target companies has changed or, perhaps more correctly, the public perception of those companies has changed. Opponents of restrictive tender offer regulation would be hard8. See P. DAVEY, supranote 2, at 1-3.
9. See DEVELOPMENTS, supranote 3, at vi.
10. See Greenhill, Structuringan Offer, 32 Bus. LAw. 1305, 1308 (1976).
11. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 1600-1613 (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1977)
(20-70 days from date of filing to effective date of tender offer).
12. Aranow, Einhorn, and Berlstein list many of the defensive tactics used by subject
company management. Among other things, these include
establishment of Employee Stock Ownership Plans .. .[under] the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), . . . [l]itigation challenging
the offer as violative of: (1) Sections 13(d), 14(d), and 14(e); (2) antitrust laws; (3)
margin requirements; (4) Interstate Commerce Act; (5) Public Utility Holding
Company Act; (6) Federal Communications Act; (7) Investment Company Act;
(8) state securities laws. . .[c]reation of incompatibility of target and offeror by
the acquisition of another company. . .[and] negotiation of defensive merger.
DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 3, at 197, 199, 200 (citations omitted).
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pressed to argue that the companies involved in the most prominent hostile takeovers in 1976 and 1977 were managed by inefficient executives who needed to be replaced by more competent
managers who could better utilize the productive assets of the target company.' 3 Again, while meaningful data has not been collected and made generally available, the common belief is that the
typical target companies today are successful participants in their
particular fields and are managed by able personnel.14 The criteria used in identifying target company candidates thus appear to
have become the same criteria, from a business perspective, as
those used to select acquisition candidates generally. Stated differently, the tender offer has been added to the package of routine
alternatives an acquisitive company can utilize.
In the course of this maturing of the tender offer, the general
perception of management's role has also evolved. The knee jerk
opposition to a takeover attempt, 5 whatever the price, has gone
out of style. Corporate executives and directors are expected to
give due consideration to the interests of shareholders when an
acquisition or takeover offer is made. 6 Management is also expected, by shareholders and others, to try to find a better deal,
whatever that may be."7
II.

SOURCES OF MANAGEMENT'S ROLE

The Williams Act amendments18 to the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934,11 the state takeover statutes, and the tactics employed
by offerors take into account to differing extents management's
role in the takeover process. Yet, no consistent model of that role
has been drawn.' The federal and state legislation seem to proceed 2 from divergent positions.22 The federal law presupposes
that incumbent management has a limited function to perform
13. See Ehrbar, CorporateTakeovers Are Here to Stay, FORTUNE, May 8, 1978, at 91;

Wall St. J., Sept. 6, 1978, at 1, col. 6.
14. See Troubh, Characteristicsof Target Companies, 32 Bus. LAW. 1301, 1301

(1976).
15. See Flom, supra note 4, at 1319.
16. See Butler, Management'sResponsibilitiesin Responding to a Takeover,7TH ANN.
INST. SEC. REG. 221, 227-28 (1975); Small, Defending Target Companies-General
Perspectives, 32 Bus. LAW. 1349, 1349 (1976).
17. P. DAVEY, supranote 2, at 23.

18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), 78m(e), 78n(a)-78n(t) (1976).
19. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbb (1976).
20. SeeCohen, Tender Offers and Takeover .ids, 23 Bus. LAW. 611, 616-17 (1968).
21. See generally 28 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 955 (1978).
22. The Williams Act amendments appear to contemplate that management's only
role in a tender offer is to make a recommendationto security holders with respect to ac-
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and that, in fact, management needs to be restrained in its participation in the takeover process. 23 The state statutes, on the other

hand, often give to management a central responsibility in the
takeover process.2 4 In simplest terms, the state takeover statutes
have been enacted to affirm the natural function of management

which the federal legislation almost denies. These competing statutory interpretations have allowed offerors to try to cast management's responsibility in the tender offer context in a way that
permits offerors to restrain management opposition to the take-

over attempt.2 5
Notwithstanding the intense takeover activity in recent years
and the accompanying abundance of lawsuits and resulting reported decisions, there is very little case law directly pertinent to
the analysis of management's role. The propriety of certain defen-

sive tactics, particularly the issuance of shares to friendly entities,
has been explored in various decisions,2 6 but the holdings in those

cases do not afford a broad analysis of management's range of
conduct.2 7 Litigation arising from the takeover attempts directed
ceptance of the offer. See 15 U.S.C. § 78(n)(d)(4) (1976). Such recommendations are
subject to the general antifraud provision contained in § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78(n)(e) (1976).
23. H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprintedin [1968] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 2811, 2813-14.
24. Many of the state statutes are applicable only when the board of directors of the
target company has neither approved nor recommended the tender offer. E.g, N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW § 1601(b)(5) (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1977); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §
1707.041(A)(1)(d) (Page Supp. 1976); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 552.01(5)(e) (West Spec. Pamph.
1978). The premise for this oft-criticized exception is that shareholders do not require the
protections provided by these statutes when the management has negotiated with the offeror and has ultimately approved the offer. Many state statutes also look to management
to decide whether the protection of shareholders requires a hearing on the disclosures surrounding and, in some instances, the fairness of the offer. Eg, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN., §
36-347e to 36-347f (West Cum. Supp. 1978); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.04 1(B)(1)(b)
(Page Supp. 1976).
25. For example, offerors sometimes use the "bear-hug" approach to bypass the opposition of management by telling management that they have a duty to put the offer immediately before their shareholders. In fact, a "bear-hug" type offer is often furnished to
each member of the board of directors in anticipation that one director will fear personal
liability if he fails to disclose the offer to the shareholders. Consequently, he will go public
himself or force the corporation to make an announcement.
26. See, e.g., Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp., 528 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1975); Oscar Gruss &
Son v. Natomas Co., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,258 (N.D.
Calif. 1976); Northwest Indus., Inc., v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706, 712 (N.D. Il
1969); Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 43 Del. Ch. 353, 230 A.2d 769 (1967). Cf.
Chicago Stadium Corp. v. Scallen, 530 F.2d 204 (8th Cir. 1976) (issuance of shares to target
president).
27. The affirmation in Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 40-41 (1977), of
the significance of state corporation law in takeover contests may encourage litigants and
judges to look more closely at management's response to takeover attempts.
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against Gerber Products Company, Sunshine Mining Company,
and Medusa Corporation,28 may provide guidance on management's ability to oppose offers that some shareholders may consider attractive. Without a meaningful body of decisional law,
finding and exploring management's justifiable role in the corporate takeover involves looking at the package of legal rules within
which corporate managers are bound and then considering the alternative functions that management may exercise in tender offer
transactions.
A.

The Failureof CorporationLaw to Recognize the Takeover
as a LegitimateAcquisition Device

Corporate statutes and corporate common law are only indirectly pertinent to what management does when a takeover is attempted. This silence of corporation law ought not be taken,
however, as a determination that management does not have a
role. Rather, that silence exists primarily because modem corporation law statutes were drafted prior to the recent period during
which tender offers have been used with great frequency.29 The
28. These three cases aptly illustrate the different factual contexts in which shareholders may believe that they have been injured by the reaction of the company's management
to a takeover attempt. In April 1977, Anderson, Clayton & Co. announced its intention to
offer to purchase shares of Gerber Products Company at $40 per share. Subsequently, the
intended offering price was reduced to $37, and finally the proposed offer was withdrawn.
The Gerber management had been successful in using the Michigan takeover statute, lawsuits, and other tactics in keeping the offer from being made. Berman v. Gerber Prods.
Co., No. 77-402 (W.D. Mich. July 19, 1978). The Sunshine Mining Company management was not as successful as Gerber in using the Idaho takeover statute and the federal
securities laws to stop the offer by Great Western United Corporation. When that offer
was finally made in October of 1977, it was $1.75 per share less than had been proposed by
Great Western in March 1977. Medusa Corporation had received takeover overtures from
Moore-McCormack Resources, Inc. but rejected them shortly before Medusa reached an
agreement in principle providing for a combination with Ogleby-Norton Company. The
Moore-McCormack offer did not materialize, and the Ogleby-Norton transaction was
called off. In both Gerber and Medusa, shareholders can complain about a lost opportunity to sell their shares at a price substantially above the recent market price, and in the
Sunshine Mining situation, shareholders can claim that they were damaged because management's unsuccessful attempt to stop Great Western's partial offer caused a reduction in
the price ultimately paid.
The Fifth Circuit's recent decision in Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, No. 77-2809
(5th Cir. Aug. 10, 1978), is not encouraging to the cause of successful management opposition. The court of appeals, affirming the judgment of the district court, held that the Idaho
takeover provisions, IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1501 to 1513 (Cum. Supp. 1975), were preempted
by federal regulation and invalid under the commerce clause. See generally 28 CASE W.
REs. L. Rnv. 955 (1978).
29. The Model Business Corporation Act, which has served as the basis of the corporation statutes for more than half the states, was initially published in 1950 and revised and
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continuation of that silence in recently adopted statutes3" is dis-

quieting, but largely results from a failure to see the tender offer
as simply an alternative device for effecting a corporate acquisition. Even those state takeover statutes that do acknowledge management's critical involvement in tender offers regulate the
31
takeover either as part of the regulation of securities transactions

or as an activity distinct both from securities transactions and corporation activities.32
While a tender offer can be used as an expeditious way of ac-

quiring a significant but not controlling block of stock, it is more
usually employed as a first and anticipated major step in the total

acquisition of a company. Offerors frequently state in the documents required by the Williams Act that they intend to seek control of the target company and that, following the immediate

tender offer, they may engage in a subsequent tender offer, a
merger, or another form of transaction to achieve that objective.3 3

Other forms of acquisitions are contemplated by state corporation laws and procedures enacted universally to regulate the

manner in which such acquisitions are accomplished. Statutory
mergers are transactions that can be carried out only because of,
and in absolute compliance with, specific statutory procedures. 4
Sales of substantially all the assets of a business 35and, in some
circumstances, acquisition of all the shares of a company 36 are not

enabled by statutes, but both statutory corporate law and case law
have placed limitations on such transactions, most importantly
with respect to director and shareholder authorization.
republished in 1969. MODEL Bus. CoP. ACT ANN. 2d § 1, 2 (1970 & Supps.). The
General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware was substantially revised in 1967.
30. Eg., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 1100-1111, 25140-25705 (West 1977).
31. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.041 (Page Supp. 1976).
32.

See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 451.901-.917 (Cum. Supp. 1977); PA. STAT. ANN.

tit. 70, §§ 71-85 (Purdon Supp. 1976). But see DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 203 (Cum. Supp. 1977)
(state takeover provisions included as a section of the state's General Corporation Law).
33. E.g., Proposed offer by a wholly-owned subsidiary of Kennecott Copper Corporation to purchase shares of the Carborundum Corporation (November 29, 1977); offer by a
wholly-owned subsidiary of Northwest Industries, Inc. to purchase shares of Coca-Cola
Bottling Company of Los Angeles (October 19, 1977); offer by J.Ray McDermott & Co.,
Inc. to purchase shares of the Babcock & Wilcox Company (August 14, 1977); offer by
Anderson, Clayton & Co. to purchase shares of Gerber Products Company (May 18, 1977).
34. Eg., DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 251 (1977); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.78 (Page Supp.
1977).
35. See, e.g., OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.76 (Page Supp. 1977).
36. Id. § 1701.83.
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B.

Management-The Inherent Quarterbackin Acquisitions

The critical aspect of these statutes for purposes of discerning
management's role in the takeover is the responsibility entrusted
to management. In general, the statutes contemplate that an
agreement will be negotiated and executed by authorized officers
of the company. That agreement customarily must be approved
by the board of directors of the company. While transactions of
this type have a profound effect upon each individual stockholder's investment, management unequivocally has been given
the responsibility of instigating the transaction, shaping it, approving it, and finally presenting it to shareholders for their ultimate
acceptance or rejection.
It makes sense that management should have such a pervasive
presence in transactions in which the ownership of the business is
going to be changed. Management, broadly speaking, is the best
informed group with respect to the factors that are critical in determining the value of a business. It understands, at least better
than most shareholders, the strengths and weaknesses of the corporation's business, both on an industrial level and within the particular corporation. It also has developed and knows the future
plans for the company: the new products or services that will be
developed, the lead time to be incurred before capital expenditures become productive, and the critical elements of the competitive puzzle.
Not only is management more knowledgeable than the ordinary shareholder about the worth and prospects of the corporation, management is the. natural leader of the investors in
determining whether the corporation can or should continue as an
independent entity. Management has the means and capacity to
contact substantially all investors in the enterprise, and it has the
factual foundation for identifying the course the corporation
should chart.
The exercise by management of its leadership position and its
use of its vast knowledge about the corporation are circumscribed
by the fiduciary obligation that professional management owes to
the equity investors in the corporation. As stewards of the collective investment of numerous individual shareholders, corporate
executives and directors cannot disregard investors' interests in order to protect management's special, peculiar interests in the con-
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text of a takeover attempt. 7 Yet, it is assumed so casually by
many persons that management cannot be trusted to act in any
manner other than out of its own self-interest, when a tender offer
is made for the purpose of changing control of the company.
Why is it that management should be distrusted in the takeover context when its participation is not only tolerated but in fact
mandated in negotiated acquistions? A clear affirmation of management's obligation to carry out its function in full accordance
with its primary responsibility to shareholders must accompany a
recognition of the tender offer as an alternative technique for
completing an acquisition and an acknowledgement of management's position as identical to that occupied in conventional statutory merger or sale. The American instinct for the pragmatic
solution should be allowed to overcome distinctions in techniques
and procedures that obscure the essential commonality of corporate transactions. Regarding the tender offer as a simple stock
transaction between a potential and an existing investor is nonsense. A tender offer is an acquisition alternative, and management's imperative participation cannot be responsibly denied.
III.

ALTERNATIVE MANAGEMENT RESPONSES

Assessment of management's role necessarily requires an examination of the various ways in which it may seek to exercise
that role. It may act as a facilitator of a takeover bid, or it may
seek to employ all the corporation's resources to ward off an uninvited attempt to take over the company. While the particular alternative followed will indeed alter the analysis, the same
conclusion should obtain: management's response-in terms of
favoring or opposing an offer-is not relevant; the reasons for that
response, whatever they may be, are the critical inquiries.
37. Northwest Indus., Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706 (N.D. Ill. 1969), is
one of a limited group of cases directly considering management's responsibility in the
takeover context. There it was noted that:
In arriving at such judgment [whether or not an offer is detrimental to the company and its stockholders], management should be scrupulously fair in considering the merits of any proposition submitted to its stockholders. The officers' and
directors' informed opinion should result from that strict impartiality which is
required by their fiduciary duties.
Id. at 712-13.
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A.

Management May Facilitatea Tender Offer Bid

There ought to be little dispute about management's capacity
to facilitate a takeover bid and to solicit favorable shareholder response. Many of the state statutes recognize that the protections
which they provide are not required if management does in fact
recommend the takeover offer to its investors. 8 Similarly, the
Williams Act contemplates that management may wish to recommend a particular offer.3 9 The "bear-hug" approach that has been
devised by offerors contains the hope that public awareness of a
proposed offer will push a reluctant management to support an
uninvited offer.
Needless to say, recommendation of an offer must be consistent with management's responsibilities to investors. Appropriate
relief presumably would be afforded shareholders who prove that
management in effect was bribed into supporting an offer it did
not solicit. 4°
Management's ability to facilitate a takeover bid clearly illustrates the tender offer as an alternative acquisition device. It is
probable that the decision by management to support the offer
will have come only after there has been some negotiation with
respect to the terms of the offer. Hence, management will have
been in a position to use its superior knowledge of the company's
business and to perform as a leader for the shareholders.4 '
B.

Management Solicitation of Competing Offers

Is management justified in seeking an alternative offer? This
practice has been utilized repeatedly as a defense to an unwelcome offer. Assuming that the alternative does in fact materialize,
there should not be any objection to this tactic. At the simplest
level, shareholders may receive increased consideration for their
38. N.Y. Bus. CoPi.

LAW § 1601(b)(5) (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1977); OHIO REv.

CODE ANN. § 1707.041(A)(1)(d) (Page Supp. 1975); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 552.01(5)(e) (West

Spec. Pamph. 1977).
39. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(4) (1976).
40. C Northwest Indus., Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706 (N.D. Ill. 1969)
(preliminary injunction denied to minority shareholders in suit to enjoin target company
management from exchanging its common stock with a joint venturer to defeat a takeover
attempt since no proof of fraud or breach of fiduciary duties by target company directors).
41. The late 1977 tender offer for shares of the Carborundum Company by Kennecott
Copper Corporation exemplifies this proposition. Following an offer by Eaton Corporation, which Carborundum's management deemed inadequate, a virtual auction was conducted to arrive at a more favored arrangement with Kennecott. Wall St. J., Nov. 17,
1977, at 10, col. 2-3.
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shares or all shareholders may receive the opportunity to participate fully in the change in ownership. Particularly during 1976
and 1977, there were several instances in which a second or third
bidder entered the game and put more money on the table for
investors.42
In lieu of seeking a higher cash offer, management may try to
find a transaction involving securities that has tax consequences
more desirable to all or certain shareholders. 43 Achieving a different tax result may also involve a higher priced offer, but in some
circumstances in which securities are issued such a result may
mean a lower offer with the difference arguably being justified on
the basis of immediate tax savings.
Management may seek out an alternative situation, involving
either a competitive cash offer or a negotiated transaction, simply
because it does not like the offeror. Companies have personalities
and reputations; they are, after all, extensions of the people who
run them. Management may believe that the future prospects for
the corporation's business will be better assured with another offeror in charge. More realistically, management may feel that it,
as a group of executives, will be able to work more cooperatively
in an ongoing enterprise with the managers of one offeror as opposed to those of another. The economic package presented to
shareholders in such a circumstance ultimately may be the same
as, better, or worse than that put forth by the offeror.
In each of these situations, the motive of management in seeking the alternative can be characterized differently. Most likely,
there will be a combination of motives. In any event, management
ought to be permitted, indeed perhaps required, to seek alterna42. Examples of alternative, competing offers during 1977 include the following:
Subject company
Firstoffer
Alternative offer
Milgo Elec. Corp.
$25 exchange offer
$36 by Racal Elec.
by Applied Digital
Ltd.
Data Systems, Inc.
The Babcock &
$42 by United
$65 by J. Ray
Wilcox Co.
Technologies Corp.
McDermott & Co.,
Inc.

Coca-Cola Bottling
Co. of Los Angeles
The Carborundum

Co.

$30 by MCA, Inc.
$47 by Eaton Corp.

$40 by Northwest
Indus., Inc.
$66 by Kennecott

Copper Corp.

43. See Geller v. Bohen, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
92,429, at 98,028 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. June 17, 1969) (Allis-Chalmers preferred General Dynamics over Ling-Temco-Vought). See generaly I.R.C. § 368 (a) (1) (B); Chatlos, The SEC vs.
Investors on Tender Offer, 56 HARV. Bus. Rav. 6 (1978).
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tive transactions for any one of the reasons noted or for any other
sound reason. If the alternative transaction is completed, shareholders will have benefited to the extent that the price was higher,
the offer was extended to all shareholders, the offer had more
favorable tax consequences for most shareholders, or in other
ways.
In those circumstances in which management is motivated
more by the quality of the fit and less by the price, the alternative
transaction may be less valuable in economic terms to shareholders. It is similarly possible that an alternative transaction that is
attractive to some investors because of their personal tax circumstances will not be beneficial to all shareholders, particularly speculators, and may result in at least some shareholders being
afforded an inferior economic opportunity.
If management can find an alternative deal without thwarting
the initial bid, there is little basis for objection to any of these
alternative actions, since shareholders have not been foreclosed
from any of the choices originally available to them. However,
once management resorts to litigation or other defensive practices
while it tries to find or negotiate a more attractive offer, it will
have swung the power and assets of the corporation against a bidder that, if management succeeds, will be precluded from putting
its offer before the investors in the company.
In light of the ever-present fiduciary obligation of management, the board of directors and the executive officers of a target
company should be justified in taking such reasonable action as
they deem appropriate to frustrate or delay an unsolicited takeover attempt, when the objective of their actions is to develop an
alternative transaction." Inquiry into the merits of that alternative
or its economic value in comparison with the uninvited takeover
bid is not warranted unless there is a clear showing that management is acting solely out of self-interest to the detriment of other
shareholders. In essence, management should be given wide latitude in pursuing alternatives to an unsolicited offer. These propositions should be valid whether or not management is primarily
motivated to seek a higher price for the company's stock, to obtain
tax-free or partially tax-free treatment for the transaction, or even
44. See Northwest Indus., Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706 (N.D. Ill.
1969). "After taking these steps, the company may then take any step not forbidden by
law to counter the attempted capture." Id. at 713. See also note 37 supra.
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to find a company with which management could work harmoniously.
Allowing management, instead of the individual shareholders,
to determine which offer should be acted upon by the shareholders follows from the nature of a takeover attempt. Although the
tender offer involves the separate decisions and transactions of
every shareholder, the result of their individual actions is a collective decision with respect to a change in the control and ownership
of the company. A transaction of that nature affects all shareholders, as well as employees and other persons interested in the company's business. Hence, a better decision should occur if it is made
by the entity, acting through the management, rather than occurring as a consequence of uncoordinated individual actions by
shareholders.
Shareholders are not without recourse if they disagree with the
alternative chosen by management. They can sell their shares in
the trading market, albeit at a price probably lower than would
have been available if the tender offer had been made and, most
importantly, had been completed in accordance with its terms.
Shareholders further have the annual, and perhaps more frequent,
opportunity to oust the existing management if sufficient numbers
of shareholders choose to do so. Finally, shareholders are protected by the availability of a derivative action if management
fails to act in accordance with its fiduciary obligations.4 5
C.

Management May Forestallan Offer to Await Better
Conditions

In lieu of seeking a different offer from another acquisitive
company, management may want to forestall the unilateral offer
until better market conditions exist. Without necessarily making
an immediate decision that one or more alternative plans is preferable, management may believe that more time is required for
the investing public to assess the worth of the company and to bid
up the price of its stock accordingly. Significant capital investments may have been made without the benefits of those investments having been realized by virture of an increase in their
market price. Product or market development activities may involve a substantial lag before an anticipated increase in volume is
45. See Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 43 Del. Ch. 353, 230 A.2d 769 (1967)
(court cancelled transaction in which target company issued stock to a third party in an
attempt to defeat control by offeror, as breach of fiduciary duty by directors).
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realized. Equally likely, the stock market may have gone into one
of its too frequent downspins, taking with it the price of the company's stock, notwithstanding improvements in the company's
fundamentals.
Management's decision to delay or impede an offer in these
circumstances may well be inconsistent with the preference of
some investors. Their economic circumstances may favor an immediate opportunity to liquidate their investment over waiting for
a higher price. Other investors may disagree with management's
assessment of the company's future; they may regard the proposed
offer as providing the most generous offer available in the foreseeable future.
Surely management is not governed by a minority element of
shareholders who are unwilling to wait to learn if developments
will yield a higher price. Yet, one of the options that management
does have is to recommend openly and adamantly against acceptance of the offer without undertaking any steps that would stop
the offer from being made. If management can be successful in
convincing investors of its view of the company's prospects, then
only impatient investors will accept the offer or sell in the market.
That conclusion may be appropriate for an academic debate, but
it lacks a common sense appreciation of the dynamics of a tender
offer.
Management likely regards a potential new investor bent on
acquisition as carcinogenic. Once the uninvited takeover artist has
gained even a modest equity position, the future of the company is
probably restricted. While management may be able to improve
the financial position and results of operations of the company
over a short period of time, it may not be able to interest other
companies in making an attractive acquisition offer because of the
preemptive position of the unwanted shareholder.
Therefore, management ought to be allowed to act in a manner which it believes will ultimately benefit the greatest number of
investors, even though its acquiescence in a present tender offer is
favored by certain shareholder factions. This is consistent with the
business judgment rule which enables management to conclude
46. Under the business judgment rule courts may disallow shareholder challenges to
decisions made by the board of directors if the board has adhered to its fiduciary obligations. The rule has been employed in tender offer cases when a specific defensive tactic is
under challenge. See Northwest Indus., Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706,
711-13 (N.D. Ill. 1969). Rut see Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp., 528 F.2d 225, 233-34 (9th Cir.
1975) (where the court scrutinized director activity for "compelling business purpose"
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that a better acquisition arrangement can be obtained if the stock
market improves, if the general economic environment regains
needed confidence, if the company establishes a stronger and
more consistent performance, or if present initiatives of the company are fully realized. The scope of management's action to implement its decision to prevent an untimely offer should
encompass reasonable employment of the company's assets to dissuade, forcefully if necessary, the offeror. 47
D.

Management May Stonewall an Offer

Behind the question of whether management can fight while
biding its time for a better situation is the more difficult inquiry of
whether the directors and executive officers may stonewall a
tender offer. May they oppose and obstruct all offers whatever the
price or terms offered? May they adamantly oppose and openly
fight a particular offer however fair its price and terms on the
ground that management does not want the company to be swallowed up, at least not by the immediate, aggressive business enterprise?
The conventional analysis of this response is that at some price
and on some set of terms management's interest in preventing the
takeover can be regarded only as the selfish desire of the executive
officers and directors to maintain the economic and social rewards
that emanate from running a publicly held corporation. The general feeling is that a director's and an officer's fiduciary obligation
requires that uncompromising ideas be put aside as other, more
broadly-based objections to the takeover are undercut by a good
price and other attributes of an attractive offer.4"
To decide that management cannot say, "Never, at any price,"
requires necessarily that the economic interests of the shareholders be given primacy, and as a corollary, that other considerations
be ignored. Are not non-investor interests also relevant? For exrather than applying business judgment rule). The policy underlying the rule may not be
applicable to management decisions to reject or oppose an acquisition offer inasmuch as
those decisions directly bear on the immediate value of a shareholder's investment. However, as noted in the text, there are sufficient reasons to allow management broad latitude
in making such choices.
47. The use of corporate funds to defend a takeover attempt is discussed generally in
E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 228-29 (1973).
48. Cf. Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 43 Del. Ch. 353, 230 A.2d 769 (1967)
(target management cannot defeat a tender offer for its corporation by issuing new shares
where the offeror corporation is well-managed and has no history of liquidation following
business combinations).
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ample, why is not preservation of locally-controlled businesses
cognizable? What about avoidance of economic power concentration? Should not consideration be given to the impact that a
change in control will have on communities affected by the presence of the company?
Accepting investor economic interests as a set of highly pertinent considerations in acting upon a proposed takeover bid, management still must face heterogeneous shareholders. The
shareholders may include the company's founder or his descendants, other long-term investors, company employees and officers,
nonprofessional traders, and risk arbitrageurs who know little
about the company beyond its stock market quotation and its susceptibility to instant profit. Once again, the observation that leaps
out is the contrast between the offeror's myopic focus on the quality of the price offered without regard to any duties to target
shareholders other than those required by federal and state disclosure requirements and by an arguable "anticipatory fiduciary
duty" 49 and management's focus upon a diverse spectrum of interterests pushing and pulling at its decisionmaking process. In fashioning its response, management must discriminate; it must select;
it must balance alternatives.
If one concludes that management should be permitted to
evaluate interests other than the immediate return to investors in
deciding how to respond to an unsolicited takeover attempt, there
may be particular circumstances which justify management's decision that the adequacy of the price offered is not determinative of
whether the takeover bid is in the best interests of the company.
That judgment can be reached analytically, as opposed to emotionally, only after consideration of the interests pertinent to deciding whether a takeover should be allowed to be accomplished.
IV.

NONINVESTOR INTERESTS TO BE CONSIDERED

One way to handle this vexatious analysis of legitimate interests is to confme consideration of a proposed takeover bid to those
matters that are the subject of state corporation law and federal
and state securities law. The line of this argument would be that
any other interests are not within the province of corporate management but are determined and applied exclusively by government--principally the federal government. Hence, concern about
49. See Coffey, Book Review, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 268, 273-76 (1975).
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avoiding economic concentration, under this analysis, would be
relegated to the applicable federal and state antitrust laws and
their regulatory mechanisms. Similarly, more general questions of
economic parochialism would be determined solely by the United
States Congress in accordance with its power to regulate interstate
commerce.
Adopting this line of reasoning involves turning the American
economic and corporate system inside out; the argument's premise
is that management is not permitted to make decisions outside the
realm of corporation law and securities regulation. An approach
more consistent with the American economic and political system
is to give management wide berth to reach conclusions about matters affecting the destiny of the corporation, subject always to an
insistent demand that management not act in a manner that advances its own personal interests to the detriment of investors.
Giving credence to management's advancement of noninvestor interests is made difficult because those interests can obscure
suspect selfish interests. The sincerity of management's concern
for such interests is difficult to prove or disprove in contrast to
more readily ascertainable economic distinctions. That concern
likewise cannot be isolated easily from more emotionally-oriented
management motivations. Notwithstanding the difficulty in ascertaining, and if necessary proving in litigation, the bases for management's opposition, management should still be allowed to
impede a takeover bid on bases other than its ability to come up
with more money for investors by taking an alternative route.
A.

CorporateInvestments Are Not Cash Equivalents

Has the debate about an efficient market, the adequacy of
America's capital markets, and the liquidity of a multitier trading
complex converted securities in publicly-held corporations into
little more than cumbersome forms of currency, carrying an unusual chance for loss or gain? All publicly-traded securities represent prior decisions by entrepreneurs or more conventional
investors that a particular business opportunity warranted a commitment of funds. Those funds were entrusted to managers not
only to enhance the wealth of the investors, but also to anticipate,
probably unwittingly, the furtherance of the economic well-being
of other affected persons.
The success of America's capital system appears to flow in part
from the liquidity that is afforded initial investors. The prospect of
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liquidity apparently is necessary to induce original investors to put
up cash, and liquidity in turn apparently requires investors of all
types, including speculators and other persons whose funds constitute part of the investment base.
Is it essential to the maintenance of that capital system that
takeover bids not be thwarted by management, regardless of the
worthiness of its objectives? Indeed, the inability of businesses to
raise new equity capital in recent years belies any positive benefit
that uninvited takeovers bring to the capital markets. Moreover, it
seems reasonable to assume just the opposite: the ease with which
corporate investors can carry out takeovers results in diversion of
funds that otherwise might be available for original investments.
Somehow, the means seem to have become more important than
the end. The ability of investors to speculate, sell, and profit has
obfuscated the objective of making money available to business
enterprises so that wealth, jobs, and higher standards of living can
be achieved.
Securities transactions, including tender offers, are a significant aspect of the overall American economic system. Corporate
managements make use of that aspect when they raise capital for
the expansion of business. However, by raising money in the public markets and by participating in the ongoing trading markets a
corporation and its management do not thereby become absolutely subservient to the interests of investors. The important
corollary of that observation is that the interest of a shareholder
with respect to his investment is not paramount to the manifold
interests that corporate management must accommodate as it
plays out the isolated participation of the company in the overall
economic system.
The implication of this reasoning for management's response
to the takeover is that management justifiably has more things to
think about when confronted by an unsolicited takeover attempt
than whether the average investor in the company will come out
ahead on his investment. Those other considerations, whatever
they may be in each individual situation, must be given persuasive
relevance when attempting to decide whether management can
responsibly oppose an unsolicited takeover attempt and utilize the
assets of the company to thwart the undesired acquisition.
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Consequences to Local Interests is a Permissible Concern

The implications of acquisitions generally and of tender offers
particularly on the fears of local communities and companies are
unclear. There is no adequately developed analysis for gauging
whether management's apprehensions in this regard are justified.
In the absence of meaningful conclusions, management's fears,
anxieties, and suspicions cannot be ignored.
The relevance of the impact of a takeover on a company's
broad community will vary with the circumstances. The change in
ownership and control of a company that is the dominant economic factor in a small or medium-sized American city is surely
of more real economic moment than the wresting of control of a
company managed from a twelve-room suite of offices on Park
Avenue in New York City. Likewise, the consequences of a takeover of what has been a family-dominated company can be expected to be of much greater concern to management than
handing over the reins of a company that already has been passed
among several different controlling owners.
It is not intended by this discussion to quantify noninvestor
interests of this type. Rather, the idea being asserted is that management is entitled to consider such factors for whatever they may
be worth in a given takeover situation. Hence, even when the price
is high, management ought to be justified in refusing to sell if it
reasonably believed that such a sale would jeopardize substantial
noninvestor interests.
C.

Management May Oppose Frustrationof its Reasonable
Business Objectives

In deciding to oppose a takeover, management may be acting
out of the natural desire to realize the plans that it has established
for the company and to achieve the objectives it has identified. A
cynic would state that proposition by suggesting that management
should be entitled to oppose a takeover attempt simply because
management wants to stay in control. Is this such an objectionable
basis for management opposition?
If shareholders are unhappy with management, they have the
ability to replace management. If an individual shareholder is disenchanted with the company, he has the further option of selling
his shares in the public market and putting his money into some
other venture. There seems to be little justification, however, for
giving shareholders the added ability to divert control of the cor-
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poration when a well-financed outsider decides that it wants to
make the decisions for the company's future. Corporate management becomes then a bully game, and the shareholders' greed is
the ball with which the game is played.
This brief review of noninvestor interests has not been offered
as a comprehensive analysis of the merits of various specific areas
of concern. It is intended to illustrate the necessity of opening up
the permitted scope of management's consideration when it is
confronted by an uninvited takeover offer. Management owes investors the duty of a fiduciary, but that duty should not be allowed to foreclose conduct that advances legitimate noninvestor
interests.
V.

ESTABLISHING A FOUNDATION FOR MANAGEMENT'S
RESPONSE

Managements and their lawyers have developed and implemented, particularly in recent years, varied defensive programs
designed to maintain the independence of the company. It is fair
to observe that the arsenal of tender offer defenses has not been a
match for the determined and well-financed offeror. The standard
package of defenses recommended by investment bankers or legal
counsel has concentrated primarily on beating the offeror once the
offer has been put forward. 0 Few of the usual anti-tender offer
devices have dealt with the ultimate objective: establishing the entitlement of the company to remain independent. By using tactical
devices instead of elements of a fundamental strategy, management has, at worst, revealed its concern with preserving its own
economic advantages and, at best, failed to present its defensive
program in a way that would induce sympathy among the public
and, where necessary, the judiciary.
Common Defensive Techniques are Inadequate
Perhaps one of the earliest recommendations for the potential
takeover candidate was the development of a black book and the
implementation of a general preparedness program. The essence
of this notion is to have at hand a detailed battle plan that can be
put into effect on a moment's notice, without having to take the
time necessary to develop information and documentation that
will be used in the defense. Hence, timetables, participants' lists,
A.

50. See generally Fleischer, Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 9 REv. SEc. REm. 853
(1976).
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drafts of public communications, and even drafts of pleadings are
put into such shape that the completion of a few blanks allows
management to oppose a surprise offer with confidence and efficiency. The black book concept, however, has gone out of style in
its purest form. Advisors have become concerned that the existence of such a kit creates a false delusion of security, and lawyers
have worried that a drawer full of canned material can be used to
establish management's intent to preserve its own self-interest to
the detriment of shareholders.
The types of material contained in a black book are still being
prepared by lawyers for their worried clients, but the emphasis has
changed to preparation of the management state of mind. Thus,
boards of directors are given orientation with respect to the takeover process, the possibility of multiple offers, the payment of premiums, and other pertinent information. The intent is to eliminate
any doubt or uncertainty in the minds of individual directors so
that when they are faced with an uninvited takeover bid, they can
concentrate on the merits of the offer and thus fulfill their obligation to investors. Simultaneously, the general preparation process
is meaningful in helping management identify inadequacies in its
shareholder relations program, its public communications generally, and its utilization of the assets employed in or available to
the business.
Managements also have instigated changes in the company's
charter and bylaws. Certain of these ideas are carryovers from the
concern about proxy contests. The board of directors may be classified and the election of the directors staggered; 5 ' the ability of
shareholders to call a special meeting may be made more difficult;52 and removal of directors without cause may be precluded.5"
These and similar innovations would impede an offeror from
exercising the control that it otherwise has gained through a
tender offer. By raising the possibility that achievement of actual
control will be frustrated, these defensive devices discourage offerors from initiating takeover bids. To the extent that these devices
51. See, e.g., Proxy Statement, Management of Elgin Nat'l Indus., Inc. (April 15,
1977) (for annual meeting of stockholders on May 11, 1977); Proxy Statement, Management of Lodge & Shipley Co., (March 16, 1977) (for annual meeting of stockholders on
April 26, 1977).
52. See, e.g., Proxy Statement, Management of Tremco Inc. (March 19, 1977) (for
annual meeting of stockholders on April 20, 1977).
53. See, e.g, Proxy Statement, Management of Barnes Eng'r Co. (Sept. 14, 1977) (for
annual meeting of stockholders on October 31, 1977); Proxy Statement, Management of
Ceco Corp. (March 28, 1976) (for annual meeting of stockholders on April 29, 1976).
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are permitted under the laws of the state of incorporation of the
target company, are consistent with its charter documents, and

are, in most instances, expressly approved by shareholders, there
should be little objection to the propriety of these types of defenses.5 4
There ought to be objection to these defenses, however, on the

more basic ground that they are unlikely to work. The dynamics
of the takeover process are such that management's decision to
continue to fight an offeror or to try to make peace is almost always made-in favor of peace-before these techniques can be
utilized. 55

Managements did conceive of a more effective technique-one
that works directly on the question of whether the offer may be
made-in the state takeover statutes. Until the recent adoption of

such statutes by a considerable number of states, the very few
states that had adopted them seemed to provide a restful haven for

worried executives. The validity of these statutes has always been
questioned and recently has been challenged directly.5 6 Unlike the
black book and the use of structural barriers, the takeover statutes
aid management by giving it an additional tool-time-and another forum-the state administrative agency-in which a takeover bid can be fought after it has been announced.
54. The New York Stock Exchange has vascillated on this point. Its current position
is as follows:
For many years the Exchange has encouraged the broadening of shareownership in a climate of corporate democracy and has endeavored to preserve the
basic right of stockholders to participate in the corporate affairs of the companies
which they own by requiring an informed and convenient method of voting in
proportion to their investment in the Company....
The Exchange has an ongoing concern as to the possible implications of certain so-called "defensive tactics" which would in effect discriminate between
shareholders.
Generally speaking, and [sic] arrangement which could be applied uniformly
to all transactions of similar nature and without regard to the parties involved,
normally, would not be viewed as objectionable. On the other hand any proposal
which results in either discrimination against an existing substantial stockholder
or discouragement of anyone seeking to make a substantial investment would
appear to raise substantial questions as to whether or not it constitutes an infringement on the voting philosophy of the Exchange.
NYSE COMPANY MANUAL A-30-31.
55. Among the examples of this resignation during 1977 was the ultimate acquiescence by the management of Sunshine Mining Company in the partial offer by Great
Western United Corporation. Seenote 28 supra
56. Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 439 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Tex. 1977), af'd,No.
77-2809 (5th Cir. Aug. 10, 1978); see note 28 supra.
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Companies Should Considera Declarationof Independence

In responding to takeover attempts, management needs to
refocus its efforts. Instead of establishing methods for fighting a
determined offeror, management ought to have its shareholders
decide before a crisis occurs whether they want to receive and

evaluate takeover bids or whether they prefer to keep the company independent.
The ability of management to forcefully oppose a takeover attempt would be greatly enhanced if the shareholders previously

had adopted a resolution to the effect that the interests of shareholders, employees, and the communities affected by the company

would best be served by the continued independence of the company and that management therefore should take such action as
would be appropriate to prevent the company from foregoing that
independence.5" In the event the sentiment of the company's
shareholders changed, such a resolution could be rescinded or
modified. In the meantime, management would have a justifica-

tion for interceding in any attempt to change the fundamental
ownership of the business.
Such a declaration of independence should be persuasive with

a court and should in any event substantially eliminate any suggestion that management is acting solely out of its own self-interest. A declaratory statement by the shareholders of their
preference, however, is merely that: a present affirmation of an
objective. To accomplish the stated goal of avoiding a takeover,
more dynamic action by shareholders is required.
57. This objective appears to have prompted the adoption in September 1977 of a
social justice policy by the Board of Directors of Control Data Corporation. That policy,
in essence, states that the corporation has a commitment to its employees, their communities, and the company's customers and that an unwanted takeover can adversely affect that
commitment. To further establish management's justification in opposing certain takeovers, Control Data's management proposed the amendment of its certificate of incorporation to provide that:
The Board of Directors of the Corporation, when evaluating [certain takeover
and related transactions], shall. . . give due consideration to all relevant factors,
including without limitation the social and economic effects on the employees,
customers, suppliers and other constituents of the Corporation and its subsidiaries
and on the communities in which the Corporation and its subsidiaries operate or
are located.
Proxy Statement, Management of Control Data Corp. (March 20, 1978) (for annual meeting of stockholders on May 3, 1978).
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Shareholders Could Insist on Approving Changes in Control
andHaving Dissenters'Rights

By comparing the takeover accomplished by means of a tender
offer to other forms of acquisition, shareholders could have the
same types of rights and remedies as those afforded them in connection with statutory mergers, sales of substantially all the assets,
or other conventional acquisition transactions. In essence, those
rights and remedies involve shareholder approval of the change in
control and the availability of dissenters' or appraisal rights for
those shareholders who disapprove of the acquisition.58
Since a tender offer involves an exchange between an existing
shareholder and another person and does not involve the subject
company directly as a party, there is not the usual opportunity for
regulation of transactions by the corporation or limitations upon
the activities of the subject company's board of directors in connection with the acquisition transaction. However, with a little ingenuity, substantive protection of shareholder interests can be
enforced in the context of an atypical transaction.
To achieve some form of shareholder vote upon a change in
control, it might be necessary to disenfranchise shares acquired by
a shareholder or group of shareholders under common control
with another business organization unless such acquisition of control were approved by a vote of shareholders. The definition of
control could vary depending upon the circumstances but presumably would be in the range of twenty-two to thirty-five percent.
The required shareholder vote could be among either the holders
of record prior to the acquisition of control or only those holders
unaffiliated with the person attempting to acquire control. Needless to say, the drafting of such a provision, whether accomplished
as an amendment to the articles of incorporation or as a change in
the statutory corporation law, would entail extreme care and
thoughtfulness. The basic notion, however, is simple: fundamental changes in corporate ownership and control should not be accomplished without broadly based shareholder approval.
In lieu of, or in addition to, creating a limitation upon the actual acquisition of control, a remedy could be afforded to those
58. In Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 351 A.2d 570 (Del. Ch. 1976), rev'd on other
grounds,383 A.2d 278 (Del. 1977), the court characterized the minority shareholder's claim
as one for appraisal rights in the context of a tender offer and noted that no such relief was
now available under either the Delaware statute or equitable principles. 351 A.2d at 576.
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shareholders who find themselves in a minority position, either in
effect or in fact. Again, by defining a change in control as the
acquisition of a stated percentage of the common stock of the
company, shareholders could be given the right to be paid the fair
value of their shares upon an unapproved change in control. The
determination of fair value could be handled much as it is in present dissenters' rights statutes,5 9 or it could be achieved through
application of a predetermined formula referring to such factors
as book value, recent market values, and similar indicia of
value.6 °
The thrust of both these approaches is prevention of a unilateral valuation of the company and a seizure of control based on
that value. The prospect of shareholder approval or of dissenters'
rights would encourage an offeror to negotiate a transaction. The
process of negotiation implies both the ability to bargain for the
best price available and the ultimate alternative of saying "No."
By giving the negotiation process a set of guidelines with respect
to the fair value that shareholders require, management would
both know the objective of its shareholders and be conscious that
it could not oppose offers within that objective simply because
they were unattractive to management.
Neither of these approaches, whether used jointly or separately, absolutely precludes a tender offer or the acquisition of a
controlling position by use of a tender offer. Rather, they put an
offeror on notice that its plan to take control of the company will
be realized only if it can convince the shareholders that such a
change makes sense and that the consideration to be offered for
the shares indeed represents a fair value for the company at the
present time.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Lawyers counseling clients that are considering making a takeover bid or corporations faced with an imminent or present uninvited offer, as well as judges deciding challenges with respect to
management conduct in the course of the tender offer, need a con59. See, e.g., DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 262 (Cum. Supp. 1977); OHIo REv. CODE ANN.
§ 1701.85 (Page Supp. 1976).
60. This tack was taken by the shareholders of Rubbermaid, Inc. when they added to
their Amended Articles of Incorporation the right of shareholders to have shares redeemed
at a formula price upon a change in control caused by a tender offer. Proxy Statement,
Management of Rubbermaid, Inc. (March 24, 1978) (for annual meeting of shareholders on
April 25, 1978).
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ceptual framework for reaching judgments. Such a structure cannot be discerned from the reported decisions. Reference to
general principles of fiduciary duty provides some guidance but
may lead to a faulty, overly simple analysis of the diverse criteria
in tender offer decisionmaking.
The rhetoric of proponents of the tender offer device suggests
that management confronted by a takeover attempt must divorce
the needs of the ongoing business and its broad community from
the needs of shareholders, especially those shareholders with no
commitment to the continued independence of the corporate entity. Thoughtful consideration, however, suggests that management ought to be able to respond to a takeover attempt in
different ways. It may facilitate the offer being made to shareholders; it may seek out better alternative transactions involving the
acquisition of the company; it may thwart a takeover attempt until
general economic or particular company fortunes improve; and it
may simply say that a change in control is not desirable.
While a foundation for these various reactions is discernible
upon exploration of the use of the tender offer technique as an
acquisition device, management's basis for opposing unnegotiated
takeover attempts would be strengthened by the adoption of
shareholder resolutions or charter amendments to the effect that a
change in control is not to occur unless expressly approved by
shareholders and upon payment of a price fair to all investors.

